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PETER R. NEHEMAKS, JR.t
"Well, sir, have you come to settle?"
"Yes, I have, sir, . . . the debt's two pound ten and the costs
three pounds five, and here it is, sir." - TAo Pic wickT Papers
I
THE unprecedented release of consumption credit to masses of wage
earners during the years 1920-1929, and the drastic changes in con-
sumption habits resulting from the selling campaigns which were
fought over a nationwide front,' have not been without effect upon
the courts. How successfully the courts have been able to with-
stand the impact of the changed consumption system, and their
ability to adjust a judicial procedure designed for an earlier and
less complex economy, may be examined from a study of a special-
ized debt collection court. The -Boston Poor Debtor Court readily
lends itself to such analysis. Its experience has extended from the
colonial court which imprisoned for the non-payment of debt to the
modern supplementary process court devoted almost exclusively to
the collection of consumption credit judgments.
The statute under which the Poor Debtor Court functions was
adopted in 1927,2 and embodies substantially the equitable process
or Dubuque Law, as it is parochially known, for the collection of a
judgment, which had been employed exclusively in judgments for
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1. See generally I1 RECENT SOCIAL TRENDS (1933) 857-911; SELIGr=IAN,
EcoNouics OF INSTALmENT SELLING (1927); Ayres, M. V., Instlmcnt Selling
and Its Finan cng, paper presented at the Third National Automotive Financ-
ing Conference, November 15-16, 1926; I RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES (1929)
chaps. I & IX; CLARe, FINANCING THE CONSUMER (1930).
2. ACTS (1927) c. 334. AN ACT To REVISE THE POOR DMsOR LAW BY PRO-
vIDING FOp SUPPLMENTARY PROCEEDINGS IN CIVIL AcnoNs. The present law
is substantially S. No. 518 (1915) drafted again as H. No. 617 (1919) and




necessaries and labor performed.3 Under the Dubuque Law au-
thority was placed in the court to order payments by instalments,
to modify payments, or revoke the order. U1pon failure to comply
with a court order, the debtor was to be adjudged in contempt and
might be committed to prison. The "equitable process" law was
intended not only as a measure of protection to the small shop-keeper,
who had provided the necessaries of life and to the laboring man
who had performed services, but equally to the
"poor people for whom these services had been performed, and who, from
unfortunate circumstances might be reduced to utter destitution, however
honest they might be unless there was some protection provided in the
form of a court order for gradual payments, and a prohibition of attach-
ment of wages pending the proceedings." 4
By the terms of the 1927 Act a judgment creditor may file in court
an application for supplementary process, causing a summons to
issue requiring the judgment debtor to appear for an "examination
relative to his property and ability to pay." 5 If the court finds that
the debtor has no property and is unable to pay the judgment, the
proceedings may be dismissed.0 If, however, the examination dis-
closes that the debtor is in possession of property not exempt from
3. AcTs (1898) c. 549.
4. JUDICATURE COMMISSION REPORT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 46. The
report of the Municipal Court to the City of Boston criticized the "equitable
process" law as follows: "It seems a fair comment that what was originally
intended to be a simple procedure, devoid of technicality, has in practice be-
come highly technical and a trap for the unwary. The chief causative factor is
legislation in extreme detail, reducing to the point of extinction the rule-making
power of the court, which might be otherwise used for relief from hard con-
ditions. . . . An attempt on the part of a genuinely poor debtor to secure
relief through the poor debtor's oath without the assistance of counsel is a
:perilous adventure. The attention of the creditor is focused quite as much
-upon the opportunity to catch his adversary napping, and thereby transfer the
-debt to the shoulders of a friendly surety, as upon any real examination in the
debtor's finances. The main objective is possession of the debtor's person upon
the execution." REPORT OF THE MUNICIPAI COURT TO THE CITY OF BOSTON, DOC,
115 (1915) at 9. Cf. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF MASSACHUSETTS, Sixth Annual Report
(1930) 30; Ginsberg, The New Poor Debtor Law (1928) 8 B. U. L. REV. 23.
5. § 14. (Sections hereafter cited alone refer to GEN. LMws (1932) c. 334).
A judgment debtor who has been arrested on mesne process or on execution may
likewise file an application for supplementary process and cause service to be
made upon the-judgment creditor or his attorney of record in the action, ro.
quiring the judgment creditor to appear at the examination. The examination
may be oral or in writing at the discretion of the court. § 15. The practice in
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being taken on execution,7 he may be ordered to produce it or to
assign it to the creditor.8 Or, if the examination discloses that the
debtor is able to pay the judgment in full or by instalments, the
court may so order the judgment to be paid.9 Failure "without
just excuse" to comply with a court order constitutes a contempt
of court punishable by a fine of not more than twenty dollars or by
imprisonment in the common jail for not more than thirty days.1 0
The court may, however, at any time renew, revise, modify, suspend
or revoke any order previously entered. 1 But no appeal will lie
7. The oral examination of the debtor usually consists in an attempt by the
creditor to disclose property in the debtor's possession other than that allowed
by the exemption statute. Cf. GEN. LAws (1932) c 235, § 34.
8. § 16.
9. Ibid. The instalment payment of judgment debts, particularly as applied to
wage-earners, is not unique with the Boston PZor Debtor Court. For a similar
procedure, but more nearly approximating bankruptcy, see LAws o NEBnAsKA
(1917) 6. 164, the provisions of which are discussed by Palmer, A Poor faz1.'a
Receivership (1917) 85 CENT. L. J. 99. Ohio provides for wage-earner instalment
payments through the appointment of a trustee upon application of the debtor.
See OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1931) §§ 1558-54c, 1579-291; DRAFt OF A UNIFORI
MUNIciPAL COURT AGT § 9, prepared by Hessel E. Yntema of the Institute of
Law, The Johns Hopkins University. Here the Clerk of Court serves as trustee
and distributes the money paid into court on a pro-rata basis to the various
creditors having claims for necessaries against the debtor at the time of the
application. No proceedings in attachment, aid of execution or otherwise, to
subject the personal earnings of the debtor to the payment of claims for neces-
saries may be brought so long as "at least twenty per centum of the personal
earnings of such debtor is paid to the trustee at regular intervals, as fixed
by the court. . . " Thirteen Ohio cities-Cleveland, Columbus, Toledo, Con-
neaut, East Liverpool, Fosteria, Lorain, Massillon, Newark, Piqua, Springfield,
Steubenville, and Zenia-have in operation substantially the debtor's trustee
process which has been described. The main variation in the provisions in the
acts where the trustee procedure is in operation is the minimum percentage of
the debtor's personal earnings -which is to be paid into court. The most fre-
quent provision is that the percentage shall be fifteen. Other of the municipal
acts provide for the minimum payment of twenty per cent, and the Conneaut
act provides for the payment of not more than fifty per cent of such personal
earnings, leaving the precise per cent to be determined by the court. Amortiza-
tion of wage-earner debts is also made possible through the small claims statutes.
Thus, Kansas provides for a Small Debtor's Court with jurisdiction of all small
debts and accounts not exceeding twenty dollars. KAN. REV. STAT. ANN. (1923)
c. 20, §§ 1301-1312. For a factual study of the operation of one small claims
court, see Clark and O'Connell, The Working of the Hartford Small Claims Court
(1929) 3 CONN. B. J. 123, and for a general discussion of the problem, see
Sturges and Cooper, Credit Administratiol and Wago Earner Bankruptcies
42 YALE L. J. 487, 513-525.
10. § 16. But a sentence for contempt does not end the proceedings nor any
order made therein, the Court retaining jurisdiction until an order is entered
expressly dismissing the proceedings.
11. § 16.
from any judgment, order or sentence entered by the court.12 In
the words of Chief Justice Rugg, the Act was designed,
"to provide a searching inquiry into the ability of the judgment debtor
to pay his legal obligation, to relieve him from harassment if found unable
to pay, but to compel him to do what an honest man ought to be willing
to do if found able to pay in whole or in part." 13
The Poor Debtor Court is an integral part of the Boston Munici-
pal Court and is presided over by the same judges who regularly
sit in the Municipal Court sessions. Including the Chief Justice,
nine municipal court judges may be assigned to preside over poor
debtor sessions for a fixed period during the course of the year.
With the exception of the summer months, court begins at eleven
o'clock and continues until one or one thirty o'clock or later depend-
ing upon the volume of cases'. One hundred and fifty to two hundred
cases on an average are called daily.14 The court procedure follows
a definite routine: before any oral examinations are heard the clerk
announces that the court will hear any arrangements for payments
which the parties have agreed upon outside of court. The debtor
having been sworn, the agreement is usually allowed by the court
perfunctorily. Frequently an agreement entered into by the parties
is approved by the court although the debtor has no possibility of
meeting the stipulated payments. In many instances, the debtor has
consented to the agreement only to rid himself of the pressure
which the creditor may have brought to bear upon him. In such
cases defaults, continuances, contempt citations inevitably result,
and the whole collection apparatus of the court must be brought
into operation to collect an instalment that should not have been
12. Giarruso v. Payson, 272 Mass. 417, 420, 172 N. E. 610, 611 (1980). But
cf. § 19 for exceptions. Findings of fact in poor debtor matters are ordinarily
not open to review. Hayward's Case, 10 Pick. 358 (1829); Fletcher v. Bartlett,
10 Gray 491 (1858); Russell v. Goodrich, 8 Allen 150 (1864). Thus it has bcon
held that a writ of error does not lie from the Poor Debtor Court, since the
procedure there is not "according to the course of the common law", but "savors
strongly of proceedings in equity". Giarruso v. Payson, supra, at 420. The
earlier "equitable process" proceedings under STAT. 1898, c. 549 were likewise
treated like proceedings in chancery. Brown's Case, 173 Mass. 498, 53 N. H.
998 (1899); of. Bornstein v. Justices of Municipal Court, 269 Mass. 515, 169
N. E. 410 (1929); Swan v. Justices of the Superior Court, 222 Mass. 542, 111
N. E. 386 (1916).
13. Giarruso v. Payson, supra note 12, at 420.
14. At the Poor Debtor session scheduled for July 15, 1932, occurred the
largest number of citations in the history of the Poor Debtor Court when 309
judgment debtors were cited for a single day. See Boston Transcript, June
30, 1932. When the docket is exceptionally heavy cases will be sent to other
sessions of the Municipal Court for disposition.
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permitted in the first instance. Under this preliminary routine
requests for additional continuances of the case are heard by the
court.
The next step in the court room procedure is the calling of the
docket list of cases scheduled for the day. The clerk may report
that the creditor's attorney is engaged in another court and request
that the court hold the case over for the end of the session. The
practice lends itself to abuse. Thus, an engagement slip will be
filed by an attorney who seeks to avoid appearing before a particular
judge whom he believes to be lenient toward debtors. The device
is sometimes used as a means of "wearing the debtor out." Thus,
a workingman summoned to appear in the Poor Debtor Court has
not only lost several hours pay, and been caused the embarrassment,
perhaps, of explaining his forced absence from the job to his em-
ployer, but on arriving in court is informed that the creditor's
attorney is engaged in another court. Either because he is unaware
that he is expected to remain in the courtroom until his case is again
called by the clerk or thoroughly annoyed with all that has hap-
pened, he leaves the courtroom. Since he is now in contempt of
court, a capias will be issued for his arrest.15  This procedure may
continue from time to time. And the debtor will, of course, be
compelled to pay for the cost of his own arrests in his final settle-
ment with the creditor. On the first calling of the docket-list, both
creditor and debtor may have failed to appear and the clerk will
announce the proceedings dismissed; or the creditor alone may have
failed to appear, and thereby caused the proceedings to be dismissed.
Should the creditor be present and the debtor in default, the clerk
will issue a capias for his arrest. It may be that the creditor has
not been able to secure the service of a summons or capias on the
debtor and he will now petition the court for the issuance of a
second or a third citation as the situation may be. At this time
the creditor through his attorney may announce that he desires to
dismiss proceedings, having reached a settlement -with the debtor;
or persuaded by the futility of attempting to collect anything on his
judgment, the creditor may have decided to abandon the case and
request a dismissal. A petition for a notice to show cause as to why
the debtor should not be adjudged in contempt of court for failure
to obey an order to pay may be filed with the court; a notice to
show cause having been issued and the debtor having failed to ap-
pear, the creditor may ask for a capias for his arrest; or, having
settled with the debtor after the issuance of the "notice to show
cause", the creditor may ask that the proceedings be dismissed; or,
15. Cf. Manning v. Reynolds, 164 Mass. 150, 41 N. E. 62 (1895).
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again, the clerk may announce that the proceedings are being held
open since the creditor has not returned the notice to show cause
to the clerk's office. For failure to return a capias or summons
on its due date, the clerk will announce at this time the dismissal
of the proceedings. On the debtor's name being called, the clerk
may inform the court of his petition in bankruptcy and the creditor
will ask that the case be continued four or eight months to await
the outcome of the bankruptcy proceedings. Having thus disposed
of the procedural minutiae, the clerk will call for the examination
of debtors. The purpose of the examination as has been seen is to
give the creditor an opportunity to ascertain whether the debtor
possesses property 11 or is able to pay off his judgment by instalment
or deferred payments. At the examination, additional evidence may
be introduced to show the changed circumstances in the debtor's finan-
cial condition for the purpose of demonstrating that the debtor has
(a) wilfully neglected to pay a previous order and should be punished
for contempt, or (b) that the debtor's altered circumstances neces-
sitate a further continuance of the proceedings, or an outright dis-
missal. In the case of the inarticulate debtor or one speaking a
foreign tongue, unless represented by counsel, 17 the possibilities of
successfully explaining "altered circumstances" to a court (which
has, perhaps, just announced on the debtor's taking the stand that
upon him "lies the burden of proving by a preponderance of evi-
dence why he should not be adjudged in contempt of court") are
remote. To illustrate from a case history (17160): On May 11,
1928, the debtor was summoned to appear before the court for an
examination relative to his property and ability to pay. He de-
faulted and thereafter a capias was issued for his arrest; on July
.6, 1928, the debtor appeared in court in the custody of a constable
and was ordered to pay $2.00 weekly on account of his judgment
for $50.16. Shortly afterwards, the creditor reported to the court
that'the debtor had defaulted in his payments and petitioned the
court for a notice to show cause why the debtor should not be
adjudged in contempt for failing to make the payments as ordered
by the court. This same process of default and arrest continued
until June 22, 1932 when the debtor was again examined. By this
time interest on the judgment amounted to $14.85; the costs on
16. See note 5, supra.
17. In 1931, debtors were represented by counsel in 77 cases; in 1932, in 79
cases. A debtor who is represented by counsel is apt to create an unfavorablo
impression on the court. For, obviously, if the debtor is able to engage counsol,
the question of why he is unable to pay his judgment is uppermost in the thought
of the particular judge. For this reason debtors are frequently advised by
counsel without actually being represented at the examination.
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the various services was $33.00-a total cost to the debtor of $47.85,
almost the amount of the original judgment. Since the judgment
had been entered against the debtor four years prior, there had been
several additions to his family; his wife had been to the hospital
for several operations. In addition to being under court orders in
the Boston Poor Debtor Court, the debtor was under orders on a
judgment in one of the suburban courts. Two attachments on his
$35 weekly wage hd been made within a year. His rent was $380
in arrears. Altogether over the four year period the debtor had
made some seventeen payments to the creditor. None of the fore-
going evidence was introduced into court by the debtor due to his
fright. Undoubtedly, had the debtor been represented by counsel
his "altered circumstances" would have been presented to the court's
attention.' Had the debtor been more articulate or the court sur-
roundings less formidable, any one of the foregoing events might
well have served as an adequate defence. As it was, the case was
dragged through four years; relief was denied a harassed debtor;
the costs practically equalled the value of the judgment; and when
the debtor finally sought the advice of counsel, the creditor lost any
further opportunity for receiving payments, since the debtor was
advised to file a petition in bankruptcy.
The oral examination of the debtor by the creditor's attorney
tends to consume more time than is warranted by the results: too
often the creditor launches forth on a wish fulfillment expedition
in the hope of finding property which there is clearly no possibility
of discovering. This preoccupation by creditors with the finding
of property of the debtor had been the cause to a large extent of
the criticism of the 1898 Poor Debtor Law.' Examination of debtors
by creditors had become under the old Dubuque Law something in
the nature of an organized contest played under court rules. Counsel
exerted every effort to trace some property into the debtor's owner-
ship. The debtor countered by attempting to explain away the
supposed ownership. A successful outcome depended on preventing
the debtor from explaining what he had done with property he had
never owned. -The examination of debtors under the present poor
debtor law is not altogether free of the evils of the earlier law.
The initiative in conducting the examination might well be left with
the court, with counsel merely guiding the court by the presenta-
tion of evidence.20 In the writer's opinion, wherever he has seen
the bench conduct the examination, results satisfactory to both the
18. But cf. note 17, supra.
19. See note 4, supra.
20. " Cf. Lewinski, Courts and Proccdure in Gcrman y (1910) 5 Ih.t L. Rsv. 193.
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creditor and the debtor have invariably followed, with a saving of
time to all parties. With the court taking the initiative in conduct-
ing the examinations, the debtor is apt to feel that the court Is
befriending him, and will generally answer questions tTuthfully and
directly. On the other hand, with creditor's counsel conducting the
examination, the debtor feels a natural antagonism, is constantly
on the defensive and too often advisedly evasive.
II
Having seen the Poor Debtor Court as its judicial machinery
functions on a typical court day-the issuing of the capias', the cita-
tions for contempt, the dangers that lie in wake for the debtor
unfamiliar with the intricacies of the courtroom, the motions and
petitions, the examination of the debtor by the creditor's attorney-it
becomes important to subject the court and its procedural operation to
a more particularized analysis for an answer to the following ques-
tions: What kind of persons are dealt with by the Court? Who are
the creditors? How large are the debts? How effective is the Court's
procedural machinery in serving the creditor; in affording relief
to the hard-pressed debtor? The following analysis of the Poor
Debtor Court is based on a study of 4866 terminated cases on the
court docket from January, 1931, through September 15, 1932.
These cases involved a total judgment-indebtedness of $1,268,962.48
-an average of $260.78 per case. In both years the largest class
of judgment creditors was retailers (2708 cases, or about 56% of
the total cases studied), with a total indebtedness of $435,575.54.
During both years individuals who had loaned money to the debtor
were the second largest creditor group employing the Poor Debtor
Court, the total indebtedness to this group of creditors being
$398,283.13 in 471 or about 10% of the total cases. Third in size
of creditor indebtedness are debts due landlords amounting to
$99,802.47 in 421, or about 9% of the total cases. Miscellaneous
and No Entry 21 items occupy the next largest groupings with
$58,919.31 indebtedness in 408 or 8% of the cases and $175,090.20
in 329 cases or 7% of the cases respectively; loan companies and
credit unions constitute the next group of judgment creditors with
judgments amounting respectively to $42,872.57 in 266 or 6% of
the total cases and $53,051.37 in 227 or 5% of the cases. Unlicensed
loan companies constituted the smallest number of cases with a
total judgment indebtedness of $10,387.89 in 29 cases or 6%
21. The "No Entry" category includes those cases in which it was impossiblo
to ascertain the creditor's business or the nature of the debt either from the Poor
Debtor Court records or the judgment papers on file in the Municipal Court.
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of the total cases. 22 The largest number of these cases, as has been
indicated, were retail items. There is no way, however, of deter-
mining accurately the exact number of cases which were the result
of an extension of instalment credit. An unpublished study made
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston of six Boston department
stores indicates that from 1927 to 1930 the annual cash sales of the
six stores which were studied have on the whole decreased; regular
charge sales have increased slightly; but instalment sales have on
the whole steadily increased.2 3  Data are not available for estab-
lishing a correlation between the rise of instalment sales during
these years and the influx of retail cases in the Poor Debtor Court.
But of the total number of retail cases studied, eighteen department
stores, employing the court with the greatest frequency, contributed
only 382 cases or 10% of the retail cases for the year 1931. The
smallest number of cases entered by a single department store was
1, and the largest number was 83. During 1932 (up to and includ-
ing September 15) 13 department stores contributed a total of 62
poor debtor entries or about 5% of the total retail cases. The vol-
ume of cases entered by a single store ranged from 1 to 24.2-
An analysis of the range and distribution of the individual debts
over the two year period studied reveals that the court largely
handles small claims.25 Thus, in 1074 cases the debt is under $50.00.
22. These 29 cases do not necessarily imply violators or evaders of the Massa-
chusetts Small Loans Law, GEN LAws (1932) c. 140, §§ 96-114, but rather that
they are companies making loans of $300 or less at a rate not in cxce-s of 12%
per annum, or if in excess of $300 not within the Small Loans Law jurisdiction.
Four of the companies included in the statistics are voluntary associations and,
therefore, not included under § 114 supra.
23. The proportions of annual cash, regular charge, and instalment sales
to total net sales in six Boston Department stores studied by the Industrial
Statistics Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston reveal the following
percentages:
1927 1928 1929 1930
Annual Cash Sales 51.1 48.3 46.3 46.1
Annual Regular Charge Sales 42.9 45.4 46.1 44.8
Annual Instalment Sales 6.0 6.3 7.6 9.1
These trends, however, have been reversed during 1931 and 1932. The pro-
portion of cash business in 1932 was higher than in any year since 1927, and
between 1930 and 1932 the proportion of regular charge sales to total declined;
a similar trend took place in the proportion of instalment sales.
24. Contrary to popular impression in Boston it would seem from these
figures that the Poor Debtor Court is not a collection agency exclusively for
Boston department stores.
25. See in general SMrH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR (1919); Bulletin 13 of the
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 41 if; Harley, Concilia-
tion Procedure in Small Cases (1926) 124 ANN. OF ADM. AcAI). OF POr.. AND SOC.
SCIENCE 91 if; Smith and Bradway, Growth of Legal Aid Work in the U. S.,
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In 1056 cases the debt ranges from $50 to $99.99. In 652 cases the
debt ranges from $100 to $149.99; and in 435 cases from $150 to
$199.99. In 726 cases the debt was from $200 to $399.99. But at
least 90% of the cases as may be seen from Table I involved debts
under $700. Since the court is one of unlimited jurisdiction, debts
ranging from $7,000 to $144,528.34 are not unknown.
TABLE I.
Range of Individual Debt.
Number of Cases
Amount Year 1931 Year 1932 Both Years Clo
$ 1.00 - $ 49.99 960 314 1274 26.1
50.00 - 99.99 789 267 1056 21.7
100.00 - 149.99 466 186 652 13.3
150.00 - 199.99 325 110 435 8.9
200.00 - 399.99 522 204 726 14.9
400.00 - 699.99 216 71 287 5.8
700.00 - 999.99 65 26 91 1.8
1,000.00 - 2,999.99 106 41 147 3.0
3,000.00 - 6,999.99 20 34 54 1.1
1931 Cases 1932 Casos
$ 7,000.00 - $ 8,999.99 2 $ 7,000.00 - $ 9,499.99 2
11,000.00 - 16,999.99 4 11,000.00 - 16,199.99 2
21,000.00 - 22,999.99 3 32,036.93 .................... 1
144,528.34 .................... 1
These judgment debts, however, are all debts owed by a single
debtor to a single creditor. The Boston Poor Debtor Court has no
arrangement for distributing debts on a pro rata basis to the several
creditors. How many of the judgment debtors owed debts to credi-
tors other than those who filed application for supplementary pro-
ceedings is not accurately known. That many debtors do owe more
than one creditor is evidenced by the frequent number of supple-
mentary process entries entered against the same debtor. Thus,
case 38870 in 1931 owed 10 judgment creditors all of whom had
begun supplementary proceedings. The same debtor was also a
judgment debtor in 1932 (case 42833). In case 42067 the judgment
debtor owed debts to four judgment creditors. From the point of
view of the creditor the present method of proceeding individually
against a debtor is costly and time consuming as will be shown later.
Whether a system of prorating debts to creditors could avoid the
BULLITrIN OF U. S. BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS 398 (1926) 22 f; 8 JOURN. or
Ai. JuD. Soc. 247 (1924); cf. Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation (1923) 36
HARv. L. REv. 361; Scott, Small Causes and Poor Litigants (1923) 9 A. B. A.
JouR. 457; Clark and O'Connell, op. cit. supra note 9.
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difficulties of the present procedure cannot be finally determined. The
problem, nevertheless, is one to be considered in any appraisal of
a supplementary process court.
II
1.
The creditor's fortunes for better or worse depend at the very
outset upon being able to serve successfully the debtor with a sum-
mons to appear in court on a specified date for an examination
relative to his property and ability to pay. From seven to ten days
elapse from the time application for supplementaryz process is
entered until the citation for the debtor is ready to be served. The
summons is usually served by a constable.20 (Most of the law firms
specializing in Poor Debtor cases employ their own constable for
this work.) The cost to the creditor of serving this initial process
upon the debtor-eventually charged to the debtor-is $3.00 for the
entry of the petition for supplementary process; $.50 for a copy
which is served on the debtor; $.10 per mile travelled in making the
service; and $1.00 for making the service.2T
The summons may be served "at the last and usual abode" of the
debtor, or by its delivery to the debtor in person.28 The summons
must be served at least seven days before the return day on which
the summons is due in court. If due service is not made, the court
may order further notice.2 9 Of the 4454 cases in the period studied,
in which summons issued, in 2839 cases the debtor did not appear
in court in answer to the summons. This may have been due to
three factors: either a service was not made on the debtor, or
the service having been made, the debtor immediately settled with
the creditor; or after having been served, the debtor defaulted. In
1931 there were only 293 cases reported in which no service was
made on the debtor; and in 1932, 107, a total of 400 cases for the
entire period. Of the 2829 cases in which the debtor did not appear
in answer to the summons, an indeterminate number are to be ac-
counted for as having been settled, and that, therefore, the creditor
did not trouble himself to return the summons to court. In 3283 cases
one summons was issued by the court; in 613 cases, two summonses
were issued; in 414 cases, three summonses; in 131 cases, four
summonses; and five summonses were issued in 13 cases. In 26%o
26. Cf. French v. Goodnow, 175 Blass. 451, 56 N. E. 719 (1900).
27. Cf. GEN. LAws (1932) c. 262, § 4.




of the cases the creditor required from two to five summonses
before service-if then-could be made on the debtor.
2.
Under the terms of the statute, the court is empowered to issue
a capias for the arrest, and to employ other processes for securing the
attendance of debtors or creditors to answer for any contempt arising
under the supplementary proceedings. 0 Where a creditor petitions
the court for a capias for the arrest of a debtor who has failed to ap-
pear in answer to the court summons, a "service in hand" rather than
the "last and usual abode" will almost always be required by the
court before granting the capias. To fulfill the requirement of a
"service in hand" the constable may state that the capias was left
with the debtor's wife or an adult member of the debtor's family.
If, however, the service was made at the debtor's "last and usual
abode" the constable is required to state that the creditor's attorney
was duly notified of the manner in which the service was made. In
short, the court will not issue a capias unless it can be shown un-
equivocally that the debtor received notice to appear in court. Nor
will the court authorize an arrest to be made after sunset. The
cost of issuing and serving a capias is $1.00 for the service of the
capias on the debtor; $4.00 for each day the debtor remains in the
custody of a constable, the constable remaining in attendance on
the debtor until expressly excused by the court; 81 and $2.00 for an
assistant to subdue the rough and bellicose debtor (an assistant is
always required).32 After the debtor has been arrested, the con-
stable will at once bring him into court. The clerk will then take
the debtor before the court, if it is in session, or to the chambers
of the Municipal Court. The question of the debtor's contempt is
then heard. The debtor must explain why he did not appear in
answer to the court summons. If the debtor is able to explain his
default satisfactorily, he may be purged of his contempt, and a date
fixed for the further hearing of the case; or the question of con-
tempt may be held open pending the next hearing. If the creditor's
attorney is present a hearing may be held forthwith and a dispo-
sition made of the case.
During 1931-1932, of the terminated cases studied there were
17 cases of commitments to jail for contempt of court. But the
number of commitments in cases still running on the court docket
is much larger. The number of days for which debtors were sen-
30. § 18.
31. Ibid.
32. Cf. GEN. LAws (1932) c. 262, § 8.
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tenced totaled 130, the largest single sentence being 10 days and
the smallest 5 days. The total number of days actually served in
jail was 37. In 10 cases the release from jail was secured by the
debtor's making a settlement with the creditor; in 4 cases the order
was revoked; in 1 case the release was secured through a writ of
habeas corpus, the debtor having filed a petition in bankruptcy.
But a debtor sentenced to jail for contempt from the Poor Debtor
Court, and who subsequently files a petition in bankruptcy, can no
longer be released from his jail sentence by a writ of habeas
corpus. 33
Case number 23541 brings into high relief the use by the creditors
as pressure devices of the capias and imprisonment for contempt of
court. On January 10, 1929 application for supplementary process
was filed against the debtor on a judgment for $180.15. On March 7th
the debtor was orally examined and ordered by the court to pay $5.00
weekly. After two months had elapsed the debtor defaulted in his
payments and a notice to show cause as to why he should not be
adjudged in contempt was issued. Having failed to answer the
notice, a capias was issued for the debtor's arrest. Shortly there-
after the debtor appeared in court in the custody of a constable and
was purged of contempt and the proceedings continued over to
August 7th when the debtor was again examined and found to have
property which was ordered assigned to the creditor and the case
held over for compliance with the order. On October 17 the order
for the assignment of the debtor's property was revoked and the
debtor was now ordered to pay $40.00 forthwith, and $10.00 by
October 21st. The debtor again defaulted in making payment to
the creditor and after being arrested and purged of contempt was
ordered to pay $25 weekly out of his income. This was on March
4, 1930. On March 28, 1930, having been found guilty of contempt
the debtor was sentenced to 5 days in jail. This same process of
continuing the case, the subsequent default in payments by the
debtor, his arrest and sentence to jail, has continued periodically.
Altogether the debtor has been sentenced to 75 days in jail, 9 capias'
have been issued for the debtor's arrest. A total of 45 continuances
from January 10, 1929, when application for supplementary process
was entered, to February 6, 1933, when the case was again heard,
involving costs to the creditor for bringing the debtor into court
and back to jail of $124.70 (which the debtor will eventually have
to pay). Here, obviously, the creditor is deliberately attempting
to "wear the debtor out". By requesting the court to continue the
proceedings, an opportunity is prepared for the debtor's default.
33. Cf. Douglas, Wage Earner Bankruptcics-State -vs. Federal Control
(1933) 42 YALu, L. J. 591, 619-620.
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The cost of the various capias' and constable fees enlarge the costs
which the debtor must eventually pay. Moreover, here the capias
is being used as a "collection club". It is against this use of the
capias-the most effective weapon against the debtor which the
creditor possesses-as a collection club that the court must par-
ticularly guard if injustice is to be avoided. Yet in the case cited,
the Poor Debtor Court (which probably included all of the Municipal
Court judges) has allowed the case to run for four years, issued
9 capias', imprisoned the debtor for a total of 75 days, and allowed
costs to mount to over half of the original judgment.
Viewing the Poor Debtor cases as a whole over the years 1931-
1932, a capias for the debtor's arrest for being in contempt of court
was issued in 1831 cases. In 869 cases, or about 50o of these cases,
one capias was issued; in 351 cases, or 187, two capias' were is-
sued; and in 400 cases, or 21%, three capias' were issued. While
most judges will not allow a creditor more than three successive
capias' for the arrest of any one debtor, there were, nevertheless,
192 cases in which 4 capias' had been granted, and 13 cases in which
5 capias' had been allowed. And in 1932 there were six recorded
cases in which 6 capias' had been allowed. The capias may be used
by the creditor over a period of from five to six weeks. A second
capias, when requested, will customarily be allowed by the court
as a matter of course. But a request for a third capias will usually
require a "good and substantial" reason from the creditor, e.g., that
the debtor has just inherited some money; that the debtor after
having been out of work is now re-employed and the creditor is able
to make service on him; or that the creditor has discovered some
property, which the debtor is attempting to hide. A capias returned
unused will automatically cause the proceedings to be dismissed. The
comparative ease with which the capias is procured accounts, to some
extent, for the frequency of its use. A common practice among
lawyers, who specialize in Poor Debtor cases, is to secure a capias
for a debtor's arrest, and then not use it. Instead of engaging a
constable to serve the capias on the debtor, the lawyers who make
a practice of this device proceed to write the debtor a dunning letter
to the effect that a capias for the debtor's arrest has been procured
but the debtor will not be arrested providing a settlement is im-
mediately made at the lawyer's office. Fear of arrest may cause
the debtor to make a small payment, or else the letter is ignored
and the debtor not heard from. At the expiration date of the capias,
a second capias is procured and the same procedure is again fol-
lowed.
It is to be noted, however, that of the 1831 cases in which a capias
was issued, 160 cases, or 3.27, were settled immediately after the
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debtor's arrest, and in 395 cases or 87, the capias was returned
to court, no service having been made on the debtor.
The history of the writ is no less strange than the institution of
which it is a part. Emerging trom a social order -which recognized
that since credit could only be given to a man with goods, it vas
just and fair that his goods should be seized if he failed to carry
out his contract, the writ of capias ad satisfaciendumn (the "ca. sa."
as it was written in the legal shorthand) was gradually extended
by custom and statute 34 so that by the eighteenth century it had
become "the bane of Mr. Micawber's e~'dstence, imprisonment for
debt on mesne process".35 Imprisonment for debt made its appear-
34. The attachment of the person, the "body warrant" or latter-day capias
was unknown to the common law, since it would seem that originally the common
law admitted of executions only against the property of a debtor. Lord Chief
Baron Gilbert explains it thus: "There was no capias for the Debt or Damages
of a Common Person, because the party having trusted him with personal Things
his remedy was only in the Personal Estate, and the King had the Interest in
the Body of his subject; and the Lord in his Feudatory or Vassal to be called
out to War or to labour for him; and therefore none but the King could imprison
him." THE LAW OF EXECUTIONs (1763) 58 ff. Cf. FLETA (1685) Lib. II, cap. 65,
§§ 15-18; Britton in his account of mesne process says nothing as to a capias in
debt. I BRITTON (Nichols trans. (1901)) c. 27. But it was not long before the
common law found itself resorting to personal execution. In the case of one class
of debts it was permitted by the statute of Merchants from an early date. Cf.
13 EDw. I. st. 18 (1285). Changes in the process of the courts and the forms of
action indirectly introduced this new form of execution. The writ of capias ad
respondendum had been a part of mesne process in actions of trespass vi et armio.
II PoLmociK AND MA TLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1899) 592; HI BL
Coii. 281; HALE, DISCOURSE CONCERNING THE COURTS OF KING'S BENCH AND
COMMON PLEAS (HARGRAVE'S TRACTs, 1787) 359. The writ was extended to
actions of account in the Thirteenth Century by 52 HEN. III., c. 23 (1267) where
it is provided that if bailiffs who are accountable withdraw themselves and have
no lands, they shall be attached by their bodies (per corum corpora attatchicntur).
With the statute of Westminster II, (13 EDw. I, 1285 c. 11) it was established
that, if bailiffs who are accountable are found to be in arrear, their bodies shall
be arrested (arrestentur corpora ipsorum). By the Fourteenth Century the
writ was extended to actions of debt, detinue, and replevin. 25 EDw. M. c. 17
(1351). And by the beginning of the Sixteenth Century, the writ was extended
to actions bn the case. 19 HEN. VII. c. 9 (1503). During Edward IM's reign
it had been established that when a writ of capias ad respondcndum lay to get
the defendant before the court, a writ of capias ad satisfackcndum would like to
obtain execution of the judgment. Y. B. 40 EDW. M, Paseh. pl. 28 (1306);
49'EDw. Hil. pl. 5 (1375); Cf. Harbert's Case 3 Co. Rep. 116 (1584). In effect
this meant the creditor could take the debtor's body in every case. Cf. Fox,
Process of Imprisonmeit at Comn w Law (1923) 39 L. Q. RPv. 46; HOIoSWoRTH,
CHARLES DICKENS AS A LEGAL HISTORIAN (1928) 137 ff.
35. See generally PARRY, THE LAW AND THE POOR (1914) 20-35; 5 ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1931) 32-38; 9 WESzrINsTER REvIM7 (1828)
42-71. 11 KENT Coni. (13th ed. 1884) 398 if. For a description of the English
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ance at an early date in Massachusetts colonial law.30 The Puritan
farmer and artisan who settled overseas brought with him a well-
articulated framework of social habits which reflected the class
heritage of the manor and the borough,87 and Marshalsea and Fleet
Street found their counterpart in the Boston jail of the Bay Colony
and early Republic.3 As late as 1829 the Boston Prison Discipline
Society reported an annual imprisonment for debt in Massachusetts
of 3000.39 And from 1820 to 1830 inclusive there was an imprison-
ment for debt in the Suffolk County Jail of Boston of 11,818 cases.
This was taking place in a population ranging from 43,000 to
60,000.40 It was not until 1816 that writs running against the body
were abolished.41 And not until 1855 did the pressure for reform
-abetted by Daniel Webster, Dr. Channing, and Edward Everett
among other of the intellectual and social leaders of Boston-have
effect. Then was enacted the statute "forever abolishing imprison-
ment for debt" in Massachusetts. 42  But the statute was promptly
debtor's prison see BESANT, LONDON IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (1902) 562 if;
SMOLLETT, RODERICK RANDOM, c. lxi; DICKENS, THE PIcKwICK PAPERS.
36. For a description of the Massachusetts' debtor's prison, see RODMAN, A
VOICE FROM THE PRISON, BEING ARTICLES ADDRESSED TO THE EDITOR OF THE Nimv
BEDFORD MERCURY (1840). Cf. I. REPORTS BOSTON PRISON DISCIPLINE SOCIETY
(1829-1834) 251 if; III THE PRISON JOURNAL (1923) No. 1, 10-14.
37. Thus, when the celebrated Body of Liberties made its appearance in 1641,
the General Court was able to decree, "That no man's person shall be kept in
prison for debt, but where there is an appearance of some estate which he will
not produce." And while the debtor might satisfy his debt by service "if the
Creditor require it," the magistrates were solicitous that he not be sold to "any
but of the English Nation." THE GENEiiAL LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF THE MAS-
SACHUSETTS COLONY (Cambridge, 1672) Section on Arrests (dated 1641-47).
See generally, TAWNEY, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM (1926) 195 ff.;
WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (1930) 35-79
(trans. PARSONS, T. from I GESAMMELTE AUFSXTZE ZUR RELIGIONS9OZIOLOMiE).
Cf. Goebel, King's Law and Local Custom (1931) 31 COL. L. REV. 416; REINsO0,
ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE EARLY AMERICAN COLONIES (1899) 11-25; I
SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (1907) 372-386; POUND,
THE SPIRIT OF THE COMION LAW (1921) 32-59.
38. Cf. RODMAN, A VOICE FROM THE PRISON, op. Cit. supra note 36, and the
annual REPORTS OF THE BOSTON PRISON DISCIPLINE SOCIETY, op. cit. supra note
36; 32 NORTH AMERICAN REvIEw (1831) 490 if.
39. See I REPORTS BOSTON DISCIPLINE SOCIETY (fifth annual report 1830) 368.
40. SPEAR, ESSAYS ON IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT (Hartford, 1833).
41. ACTS (1816) c. 111 (Dec. 14, 1816).
42. ACTS (1855) c. 444, § 1. It was not until the first number of "Pickwilel"
had made its appearance (March 31, 1836) rousing all England with its vivid
account of Fleet Street, that England became aware of the extent and de-
gradation which imprisonment for debt had reached. If Dickens was not the
cause of Lord Cottenham's Bill (December, 1837) to amend the insolvency laws,
his "Pickwick", nevertheless, succeeded in sufficiently firing a public conscious-
ness to demand action. Cf. Lord Brougham's speech to the House, 39 HANSARD
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emasculated by Chief Justice Shaw, who, in the same year as the
passage of the Act, ruled in Appleton v. Hopkins 43 that:
"Even the significant word 'abolished', when taken as it must be, in con-
nection with the other detailed provisions of the act, is found to mean
only that imprisonment for debt, from the time it went into operation,
should be modified, and mitigated in conformity with these provisions.
Writs and executions are stil to issue in the usual form, coinmanding
the proper officers, for want of property found, to arrest the bodies of
debtors."
The overtones of imprisonment for debt continued to reverberate
in the Massachusetts courts long after Chief Justice Shaw's opinion. 4
And in contemporary Boston, far removed from the debtor's prisons
of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth century, the note of imprisonment
for debt is again echoed. For the constitutionality of the Poor Debtor
statute, which empowers the court to order a debtor to pay off a
judgment on the basis of his future earning capacity, has been
challenged as a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. In Mc-
Dermott v. Bryer 45 plaintiff sought injunctive relief in the federal
district court from the consequences of an order issued by the Poor
Debtor Court. It was plaintiff's argument that the court order to
pay $200 monthly out of future earnings and the implicit punish-
ment for contempt should the plaintiff default, was in violation of
the provision of the Thirteenth Amendment prohibiting involuntary
servitude. But the federal court was not impressed with plaintiff's
REPORTs (1837) 574, in which was enunciated the principle that debt should
never be treated as a crime, and still less as a crime to be punished at the sole
will and pleasure of the creditor. Imprisonment for debt in England was
abolished fourteen years after the Massachusetts Act by the Debtor's Act,
1869. Cf., however, PARRY, op. cit. supra note 35, at 53 if. for a criticism of
the famous section 5 of the Act which the Massachusetts Poor Debtor Law of
1898 came to resemble. The reform climate affected France and Germany during
the years which witnessed change in Massachusetts and England. By Art. 1
de la lois du 22 Juillet 1867, France abolished body execution against the
person in civil matters. See 67 DUVEnGDU, CoLLEarIO DES LOis (1867) 190; 4
RtPERTOIRE GfN9RALE ALPHAB9iTIQUE Du DROIT FRANCAIs (1924) 598; ibid,
for comparative continental legislation against body execution. The only re-
maining vestige of imprisonment for debt in France is in connection with judg-
ments for damages obtained as an incident to criminal prosecutions-the
equivalent of the common law tort actions. In Germany imprisonment for debt
was abolished by the Code of Civil Procedure of 1877. See C. P. C. § 780 ff.
Imprisonment remains only in case of wilful contumacy on the part of the
debtor.
43. 5 Gray 530, 532-3 (1855). Italics supplied.
44. SEE GRINNELL, A STUDY OF THE POOR DEBTOR LAW oF MAssAcusErrs,
(1883) especially 174-177.
45. Equity No. 5411, District Court (Massachusetts) April 10, 1932.
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contention, and held that the order of the Poor Debtor Court was
not "coercing the plaintiff to a condition of peonage." 40
So a debtor is no longer imprisoned for not paying his debts. But
he may be imprisoned for being in contempt of court for failure
to obey an order relating to the payment of his debts. Should a
debtor fail to answer the court summons he is liable to arrest by a
constable. If the debtor appears before a judge who believes that
all debtors are shiftless folk lacking in thrift, or should the court
be unsatisfied with the inarticulate attempts at explanation of the
debtor's altered circumstances, the probability of a sojourn in the
Charles Street jail becomes imminent. Steady pressure from the
creditor with the capias handy as a collection club; the possibility
of being sentenced to jail or fined for being in contempt of court;
the stigma of proceedings in the Poor Debtor Court; at the opposite
polarity the escape through bankruptcy-if one has sufficient money
for the entry fees-are considerations which loom large in the wage
earner's mind.
3.
It was previously suggested that between the "screw-system" of
forcing a payment out of the debtor by the threat of arrest, and the
fear of imprisonment for contempt should the debtor default in his
appearance or fail to satisfy the court "by a preponderance of evi-
dence" of his inability to continue payments, bankruptcy was the
one escape for the hard pressed debtor. Moreover, too frequent
continuances of the proceedings by judges who are not sufficiently
familiar with the case histories before them, the entry of an order
to pay without adequate investigation of the debtor's ability to fol-
low up payments, agreements for instalment payments made by the
debtor with the creditor's attorney outside of court-in order to
avoid the immediate pressure which is being brought to bear upon
him, successfully ,aid the toll of bankruptcy. On the other hand,
46. It was also contended that the order of the Poor Debtor Court violated
the Fourteenth Amendment in that plaintiff was being deprived of his liberty
and property without due process of law. But the federal district court was
"not concerned with the wisdom or expediency of the legislation", nor was it
able to "review findings of the State Court that the plaintiff has the ability to
pay". And plaintiff's argument on the Fourteenth Amendment was dismissed
because, as it was said, first, statutes prohibiting a review of findings of fact
are not incompatible with due process of law, and, second, the "right of appeal
is not essential to due process of law." On appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals
(No. 2740 C. C. A. 1st, 1932) plaintiff was equally unsuccessful. For it was
there held that a federal court was without jurisdiction to "enjoin a supplementary
proceeding in whole or in part in a state court in aid of a valid judgment
entered in that court to enforce the collection of payment of the judgment."
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bankruptcy serves as the escape par excellence for the fraudulent
debtor who desires to throw the creditor off his trail by announcing
in the Poor Debtor court that he has filed a petition in bankruptcy.
By placing a certificate of adjudication with the clerk of the Poor
Debtor Court, the "sophisticated judgment debtor" may easily escape
from his judgment, even though he later fails to make application for
a discharge, since the average creditor feels that when the bankruptcy
stage has been reached, the possibilities of collection are slight.
Whatever was the determinative motivation for bankruptcy. there
were during the period of study 146 bankruptcy cases coming from
the Poor Debtor Court. In half of the cases (73) the mere entry
of supplementary proceedings was sufficient to induce the debtor
to file a petition in bankruptcy. And in 46 cases a petition was
filed directly following the first hearing in Poor Debtor Court; in
10 cases the petition was filed immediately after an order to pay
by instalment payments had been ordered. In short, the mere entry
of supplementary process, without any attempt at liquidating the
debt, induced about 50% of the bankruptcies; the remainder of the
bankruptcies would seem to have been induced by the extended oper-
ation of the court procedural machinery, that is, either too frequent
continuances or the entry of an order to pay. 7
The total indebtedness of the 146 bankruptcy cases was $102,
458.64. The average debt of each individual in 1931 was $706.69
and in 1932, $704.36. In 77 cases the liability was to retail creditors.
In 20 cases the debt was owed landlords; individuals were creditors
in 21 cases, and credit unions in 5 cases. Licensed loan companies
had 7 claims and the no entry group 10 claims. Liabilities charged
to miscellaneous claims accounted for 6 cases.
The average number of continuances per case in which there was
a continuance in 1931 was 2.1, and in 1932, 3. Continuances, which
might have been prevented, would seem to be the cause of 7 bank-
ruptcies in 1932 (where an order to pay had been entered). Dis-
charges were granted in 76 cases (52c) and denied in 33 cases
(22.7%) because either the fees had not been paid or the debtor
had failed to make an application for a discharge. There were 27 cases
(18.4%) pending, awaiting trustees' accounts or referees' reports.
And in 10 cases (6.8%) no entry is recorded as to the disposition
of the case.
47. Cf. Douglas, Some Functional Aspects of Baniruptcy (1932) 41 YA=
L. J. 329, note 24 at 350; Douglas & Marshall, Bankruptcy Administration:
A Factual Stvudy and Some Suggestions (1932) 32 COL. L. R1Ev. 25, 51 ff. for
data on 221 salaried Boston bankrupts from the Poor Debtor Court in the nine




An analysis of the case dismissals further discloses the failure
of the Poor Debtor Court as an instrumentality for the effective
collection of judgment debts. Once more the statistical data reveal
the stresses and strains of an antiquated judicial machinery labor-
ing under the impact of administrative and procedural problems
with which it was not designed to cope.
The analysis of dismissals is based on 4224 cases of the 4866
cases studied. This number does not include all of the cases dis-
missed during the period studied. Only the largest groups were
included and those cases where the information as to the reason
for the dismissal was complete. The total of 4224 cases is, there-




Cases reported settled .......... 548 Failure to appear
Dismissed on Creditor's oral creditor ..................... 123
motion ....................... 289 (includes 40 bankruptcy cases)
No service on Debtor both ......................... 488
summons ..................... 400 (includes 70 bankruptcy cases)
capias ....................... 395 Dismissed by Court:
Service not returned on due date reason unknown ............. 202
summons ..................... 673 Dismissed by Court:
capias ....................... 395 no property and no ability to
pay .......................... 511
Dismissed by Court:
co-debtor paying ............. 110
Table II that in 795 cases (16.3%), the dismissal was due to ina-
biity of the creditor to make a service on the debtor. Of this class
of dismissals, it will be further noted that capias process was in-
effectual in reaching the debtor in 395 cases or 8.1%. Inability to
reach the debtor by the initial summons accounted for 400 cases
or 7.6%o. In 1068 cases (21.9%o) the dismissal was due to the
creditor's failure to return either the capias or summons on the
due date. The large number of cases so disposed may be accounted
for by the following factors: (a) negligence on the part of the con-
stable in returning the summons or capias to the clerk's office on
time; (b) no service on the debtor was actually made and the
creditor did not trouble himself further with the case; (c) the
creditor succeeded in making a settlement with the debtor, and,
therefore, found it unnecessary to return the process to the clerk's
office.48  In 289 cases (5.7%) the dismissal was requested by oral
48. But the number of cases under this category would not seem to be over-
large for in 1831 cases in which a capias had been issued by the court only 3.2%
were settled following the debtor's arrest.
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motion of creditor. There is no accurate way of estimating the
number of cases dismissed under this category as a result of a
settlement between creditor and debtor. In 547 cases (11.25)
dismissals were due to the failure of appearance of either the
creditor or both the creditor and debtor. Here again allowance
must be made, in appraising the failure of appearance by the par-
ties, for a percentage of cases in which a settlement was reached
outside court. In 292 cases the precise reason for a dismissal is
not recorded on the docket. Over 10% of the cases (511) were
dismissed because upon examination it was disclosed that the debtor
had neither property nor ability to pay off the judgment by partial
payments. In 110 cases (2.2%) a dismissal was granted because
it was found that the co-signer of a note was able to pay. Prac-
tically all of these cases were on loans due the Boston Morris Plan
Company.49
Actual settlements were reported in 548 cases (11.2) : 401 cases
(8.2%) were dismissed on motion of creditor; 77 cases (1.55)
were dismissed by the court, the debtor having complied with the
court order; 30 cases (.6%) were dismissed by the court because
the parties had apparently reached a settlement; and 40 cases (.8%)
on oral motion of the debtor who had previously settled.
TABLE III
Sumrnary of 4224 Dismissals
1. Cases settled satisfactorily.
548 (11.2%) See Table II.
110 (2.2%) in which debt is being paid by co-signer
of a note.
Total 658 (13.4%)
2. Complete loss to creditor.
511 (10.5%) no property and no ability to pay.
114 ( 2.3%) Bankruptcy.
795 (16.1%) No service on debtor either by summons
or capias.
Total 1420 (28.9%)
3. Partial loss to creditor.
1068 (21.9%) incomplete process, i.e., summons and
capias not returned on due date.
611 (12.5%) failure appearance parties.
289 ( 5.7%) dismissed on creditor's request.
292 ( 6.0%) dismissed by court: reason unknown.
Total 2260 (46.1%)
49. The co-maker is always made a defendant in the supplementary pro-
ceedings, and must appear in court with the maker. Should the co-maker fail
to appear in answer to the initial summons, he is in contempt of court and a
capias will issue for his arrest.
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Under subdivision 3 of Table III "partial loss to creditor", it may
be supposed that about 20% of the cases were settled and that the
creditor (a) did not care to return the process to the clerk's office, or
(b) appear in court. If, then, these 452 cases are totalled with the 548
cases actually reported settled, it would mean that the creditor was
successful in approximately 1000 cases or about 22% of the 4454
cases in which a summons was issued following the application for
supplementary process; and in 110 additional cases the creditor might
sustain the hope. of receiving payments.
5.
It has been seen from the previous discussion, that the whole pro-
cedural machinery of the statute is directed toward bringing the
debtor into court in order that he may be examined "relative to his
property and ability to pay." Where a debtor's principal asset is not
tangible lands or chattels, but earning power, the fruitful aspect of
such an examination is not detection of property but an inquiry into
ability to pay out of the returns of future earnings. The traditional
supplementary process procedure is aimed at the detection of tangi-
ble property. It is with this procedure that the Boston Poor Debtor
Court is best acquainted. With the expansion of consumption credit
coupled with the growth of the wage system such procedure becomes
of secondary importance. The available court procedure for sub-
jecting future income to payment of debts is either an order to pay
by a stipulated date or an order for instalment payments until the
debt is finally liquidated. A fairly reliable index of a court's com-
petency in enforcing the collection of consumption debts may, there-
fore, be found in the extent and frequency of its use of such orders.
And besides the indicium which such orders afford of the court's
success as an effective collection instrumentality, they may well in-
dicate that the court is not unaware of the debtor's economic cir-
cumstances. But if the frequency of orders to pay at a deferred
date or by instalments is to be used as indicative of the court's
effectiveness in the collection of debts, the Boston Poor Debtor Court
presents a poor record. For in only 111 of the 4866 terminated
cases studied were such orders entered.
The infrequency of orders to pay however, raises serious questions
as to whether the problem of budgeting future income can be ade-
quately accomplished by the cumbersome process of hearings in
open court accompanied by a formal procedure; and if the peculiar
debt funding problems of the Poor Debtor Court are properly the
function of a judicial body at all. Again, it is a question of whether
it is not idle and mistaken to thrust what is properly an adminis-
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trative burden on an already overworked municipal court unpro-
vided with the necessary auxiliary administrative machinery.
Of the 111 cases in which the Court ordered liquidation of the debt
by instalment and deferred payments, by far the largest number
(62) during both years were ordered to be paid through instalment
payments on a weekly basis; 23 cases on a monthly basis; and 26
miscellaneously, e.g., an immediate payment to be followed by a
subsequent payment thereby completely liquidating the debt, or the
assignment of some property accompanied by one or more monetary
payments. For 1931, the average weekly amount 6rdered paid to
the creditor was $4.17. For 1932, the weekly average was some-
what lower, $3.00 per week. The monthly average for instalment
payments in 1931 was $6.44 as compared with the monthly average
for 1932 of $9.61. Of the 55 cases where an order to pay had been
entered in 1931, defaults in payments occurred in 70% of the cases.
That is to say, default occurred in 39 out of the 55 cases. In some
of these, more than one default was entered, the average being 1.4.
Of the 56 cases where an order to pay had been entered for 1932,
there were defaults in 50 cases with 1 default as an average for each
case. In 38 cases in 1931 the debtor was cited for contempt of court
for failure to obey the court order for instalment payments; and in
1932, 28 debtors were similarly cited for contempt. An increase in
the original order was made in 1931 in 1 case, but in no cases during
1932. During 1931 reductions or revisions on the original order
to pay were made in 10 cases. In 1932, the original orders in 36
cases were revised or reduced, and of these 36 cases, 20 revisions
were due to the debtor's utter inability to continue further pay-
ments. The proceedings in these 20 cases were dismissed, under
the court's statutory power, due to the debtor's being without
property or present ability to pay.r0
In the 111 cases constituting the group which received an order
to pay by instalment and deferred payments, a settlement with the
creditor was reported in 66 cases. Since payments are made by the
debtor directly to the creditor or his attorney, there is no way of
determining whether these 66 cases reported "settled" by the cred-
itor were fully or only partially liquidated. In 1931 of the 55 cases
where an order to pay had been entered an average of 144.8 days
was required for the termination of each case; in 1932 the average
number of days for the termination of the 56 instalment payment
cases increased to 257.9 days. Of the 1931 cases, 6 cases filed peti-
tions in bankruptcy; in 3 cases the bankruptcy petition followed




there were 7 bankruptcy cases and all 7 cases followed the court
order to pay.
It is not to be inferred that the above 111 cases completely or
accurately describe the poor debtor cases in which liquidation through
instalment and deferred payments has occurred. There were also,
as will be seen from Table II, some 548 settled cases in which in-
stalment payments were made by the debtor to the creditor without
a specific court order. Nor is it accurately known whether the
method of instalment payments made to the creditor from time to
time results in a complete or only partial liquidation. But the cross-
section of 111 cases where the court definitely entered an order to
pay does afford an opportunity to appraise the existing method,
and evaluate the difficulties of collection which, perhaps, would
confront any other similar method, and suggest possibilities for
improvement.
At the very outset, it is apparent that overworked municipal court
justices, who preside over the Poor Debtor sessions, are unable to
devote the painstaking care necessary to a fully adequate dispo-
sition of the immediate case before them. In the first place, the
Poor Debtor Court does not present the most exciting of the judicial
work. Most of the judges regard their periodic appointments to
the Poor Debtor sessions as an unpleasant chore and in the nature
of a necessary judicial evil. Consequently, there is a tendency to
rush through with the docket in the shortest possible time. Since
no one judge sits for more than a few weeks at a time, it is possible
for a debtor to appear before several judges, none of whom is familiar
with the debtor's background or case-history. 1 Again, the actual
51. A count of 2389 cases for the 1931-32 period studied showed the following
number of continuances:












It is apparent that the frequency of continuances, coupled with the rotation of
judges is a serious obstacle to effective administration of the cases. In some cases
still running on the court docket, the number of continuances granted exceeds
the maximum given above. Cases are sometimes continued for months and
even years.
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case records are recorded in a fashion so little short of primitive
that an attempt on the part of the judge hastily to familiarize him-eif
with the case history at the debtor's examination becomes exceedingly
difficult.5 2 Frequently, a judge is confronted with a case in which
an order has been entered by a colleague. The debtor may present
a story as to his conditions wholly different from that told at the
previous hearing. The creditor's attorney denies its veracity. The
court is confronted with 200 additional cases awaiting disposition.
There is neither time nor an established technique for investigating
the changed circumstances in the debtor's economic condition. To
avoid patent injustice (not altogether unknown) the case is con-
tinued over for the judge who first heard it again to make a decision.
The result may prove very unsatisfactory to the creditor in need of
funds, and, perhaps, make for genuine hardship on the debtor who
is usually in dire need of emancipation from debt. Furthermore,
many of the judges presiding over Poor Debtor sessions have had
to accept a task for which they are rU-prepared by training and dis-
position. They have brought to the Poor Debtor bench the pro-
cedural background of a rigid common law. Discretionary and
extremely flexible as are the powers granted them by statute, an older
discipline and daily experience with civil litigation, has sometimes
prevented the application of the informality and flexibility of the
chamber proceedings so essential to this mode of judicial determina-
tion. Under the existing method of procedure the burden of proof
is upon the debtor to show why he should not be adjudged in contempt
of court; or, perhaps, to explain to the satisfaction of the court why
his present economic condition does not warrant the court making an
order for payments. So often the judge hard pressed for time will
disregard the inarticulate attempts at explanation. But those very
explanations contain the seeds for understanding of the particular
and immediate needs of the debtor. The result of attempting to apply
52. The court order or disposition of the case is recorded by the clerk on an
ordinary lined index card. Only the bare disposition is recorded, e.g., that the
debtor was ordered to pay and the amount, that the proceedings were continued
over and the name of the judge who made the order. An attempt on the part
of the court to decipher an immediate case history without the assistance of
the clerk becomes a perilous adventure. The problem becomes especially acute
on a particular day when the court docket is crowded and time is short. Ob-
viously, there is need for a simplified, but at the same time systematic, case
history of the debtor. This should contain not only an accurate recording of
the disposition of the case, but relevant facts as to the debtor's dependents, in-
come, outstanding salary attachments, wage assignments filed, number of
creditors, amount of debt or debts, the number of continuances outstanding,
and the confidential report on the debtor's altered circumstances prepared for
the court by a trained field worker in the event the debtor pleads inability to
continue further payments. See in this connection pp. 587-590, infra.
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this antiquated judicial machinery for the collection of debts has
led to a widespread dissatisfaction on the part of creditors, who,
naturally begin to despair, after frequent continuances of their cases,
of collecting anything on their judgment. The debtor, too, realizes
little possibility of relief and must either continue to appear in court,
trusting that he may convince the court of his inability to make
further payments, stand the chance of imprisonment if he defaults
and is found to be in contempt or else resort to bankruptcy as a way
out of his debt.53 Without exception the credit managers of the
larger Boston department stores, and the reputable members of the
bar who come before the court are uniformly critical of the effectual-
ness of the court as a collection device.5 4 And the Boston Legal Aid
Society considers it little less than futile to advise a poor litigant to
seek relief through the Poor Debtor Court. In its inability to marshal
up the debtor's assets for a speedy liquidation the Poor Debtor Court
fails as a collection device for the creditor; in its inability to investi-
gate through a simple fact-finding technique the debtor's changing
circumstances in order to grant relief when needed, and the lack of
an administrative machinery for adequately budgeting a debtor's
future income, the Poor Debtor Court fails as an agency for satis-
fying the individual as well as collective needs of an urbanized and
shifting wage earner class.
IV
Conclusions
It is apparent from the analysis in the previous sections that as
an instrumentality for the collection of consumption credit debts the
Boston Poor Debtor Court is a failure. Moreover, it is questionable
whether a collection device successful in only 227 of its cases war-
rants further support by the taxpayer. Under the present system
it would seem that the only persons who prosper are the constables;
for they at least receive their fixed stipends regardless of the fortunes
of creditor or debtor. Nor is this the first occasion in the checkered
career of the Poor Debtor Court that such observation has been
made. For, over a century ago, citizens of Boston meeting at the
Exchange Coffee House were thus constrained to petition the legis-
lature for the relief of poor creditors:
53. Cf. pp. 578, 579, supra, for study of 146 Poor Debtor bankrupts; of. note
47, supra.
54. In this connection it is to be noted that the Merchant's Credit Bureau,
constituting practically all of the larger Boston retail stores, has recently or-
ganized its own collection agency. Pathological eases which normally would
go to the Poor Debtor Court for colledtion are sent to the Bureau, which employs
a special office and field staff for this work.
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"When we take into consideration the expense that attends the present
system, it appears equally evident that it is injurious to creditors as well
as oppressive to debtors. It is a matter of record . . . that for the last
ten years the amounts collected in the cases of commitments have not been
sufficient to defray the costs and expenses; so that the creditors, taken
collectively, have been losers by the operation of the law. It has also
been estimated that within the last twenty years the costs that have accrued
against insolvents have amounted to $1,000,000, which has gone princi-
pally into the pockets of the attorneys and commiting officers." 0
The major weakness of the Poor Debtor Court is patently an admin-
istrative one. In the interest of both creditor and debtor it is im-
portant to determine early in the proceedings the ability of the debtor
to pay. In case of inability to pay the debtor should be relieved from
the pressure, anxiety, fear, and cost of the present procedure. In case
of ability to pay, future income should be budgeted and a funding
program initiated which takes cognizance of income, number of
dependents, and standards of living. At the present time such pro-
cedure occurs only casually and occasionally-depending on the
degree of social awareness of a particular judge. Even for such
a judge no technique for the accomplishment of these ends is provided.
Yet, as has been seen, such problems predominate in the cases and,
in effect, submerge the earlier court function of detecting property.
The problem of ascertaining ability to pay and debt funding obvi-
ously cannot be properly administered by a judicial body already
heavily overtaxed with work. The first step, then, in any reorgan-
ization of the Poor Debtor Court would be its separation from the
Municipal Court. Instead of being presided over by the several
Municipal Court judges, the Poor Debtor Court should be under the
supervision of a specially qualified Debt Commissioner. 0 An appeal
from the decision of the Debt Commissioner would He with the
Municipal Court. An auxiliary fact-finding technique for ascertain-
ing a debtor's economic condition should be available to the Com-
missioner when needed. Such a procedure might be a regular part
of the Commissioner's administrative organization, or else made
available through existing Boston social agencies.57 As a part of the
55. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CITIZENS OF BOSTON FAVORABLE TO A REVISION OF
THE LAws IN RELATION TO DEBTOR AND CREDITOR AT A MEETING HELD AT T13E
EXCHANGE COFFEE HousE, Boston, April 29, 1829.
56. See provisions on Disclosure Commissioner, ME. REV. STAT. (1930) c. 124,
§§ 19-44.
57. Social fact-finding for the Boston Juvenile Court is conducted by the
trained staff workers of the Judge Baker Foundation. Cf. GEN. LAws (1932) c.
185, § 117 of the Land Court provisions by which an engineering staff is em-
ployed to assist the court in the adjudication of boundary lines arising from land
registration. And in the Domestic Relations Court of Boston it has been
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administrative organization there should be available to debtors an
opportunity for securing legal advice. Under the present system
there is no way for the debtor to receive legal advice as to his rights
without employing a lawyer or without having recourse to the Legal
Aid Society. This function of informing the debtor of his legal
rights is now performed largely by the clerks of the Poor Debtor
Court, who perform the task intelligently and with much understand-
ing. But there are situations in which the clerks are powerless to
help. There is the case of the wage-earner making twenty-five dollars
a week with a family of five, who was being hard pressed by his
landlord for nine months back rent. He had various debts totalling
$300 and was about to be brought into the Poor Debtor's Court on a
judgment. He sought advice from the clerk's office as to whether he
should go into bankruptcy or whether he might take the Poor Debtor's
oath. Now the Poor Debtor's oath, 5 which once might have granted
him relief, has been abolished. And the present statute affords no
relief to a debtor unless he is first brought into court on a judgment.
If the debtor's landlord ties up his salary, as he has threatened, it
means loss of job. If his judgment is brought into court, he will be
unable to pay. On which horn of the dilemma shall he turn? The
clerks cannot give advice here. For the most part they are not
lawyers, nor are they officially permitted to impart legal advice.
Shall the debtor be sent to the Legal Aid Society? But he is already
in despair from having been pushed from one office to another. In
any event it seems a denial of justice that a poor debtor should be
driven to employ a lawyer, or forced to resort to the legal aid society,
to get as a charity", as Dean Pound has well said, "what the state
customary to engage counsel to assist the court in the preparation of adequate
sociological data pertaining to the case under consideration.
58. Before the adoption of the present supplementary process statute (ACTS
(1927) c. 334) by proving on oath that he had no property to the amount of
:$20 with which to satisfy the creditor's judgment, a debtor could be discharged
from his( indebtedness. The first appearance of a poor debtor's oath in Mas-
sachusetts was in 1698 when it was provided that a prisoner might petition the
justices of the peace to bring his body without delay not over a mile from the
prison, and to certify "the cause and causes of the imprisonment". Each
prisoner coming before a justice was administered an oath substantially the
same as the late poor debtor oath, but under the colonial statute notwithstanding
the oath, the creditor could have the prisoner kept in jail for three months upon
furnishing support. See THE ACTS AND RESOLVES OF THE PROVINCE OV IAS-
SACHUsFrTs BAY, (Vols. 1-4, Boston, 1869) Acts 1698, c. 11, §§ 1-8. Under the
former Poor Debtor Laws the proper administration of the poor debtor's oath,
charges of fraud by the creditor, the default of the creditor after the admin-
istering of the oath, etc., gave rise to a considerable body of law. For a dis-
-cussion of the problems and a collection of cases, see GRINNELL, op. *it. 81pc
note 45.
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should give as a right." r9 In short, then, there is a need for an
official bureau attached to the Poor Debtor Court which would be
readily available for the poor debtor in need of legal advice.
In passing, it is well to reiterate again the need for flexibility and
informality in the hearings. The present method of oral examination
of the debtor by the creditor's attorney is little less than useless. For
even the unskilled lawyer has the debtor at an advantage, and the
formality of the procedure to a debtor not represented by counsel may
be a terrifying experience. It would seem advisable for the Com-
missioner to take the initiative in examining the debtor with counsel
presenting the evidence concerning the debtor's ability to pay.
Where the judgment debtor has more than one creditor, the Com-
missioner should have power to summon the creditors and pro-rate
the debt; where instalment payments are desirable and feasible the
Clerk of Court should serve as trustee as is done in the Ohio courts0C
But the device for pro-rating and instalment payment of debts under
the Commissioner's trusteeship should be available to any debtor (i.e.,
other than judgment debtors already in court on supplementary pro-
ceedings) owing not less than $50 and not more than $1,000, who
voluntarily petition the Commissioner of their desire to pay off their
debts. 61 The Commissioner should make possible the marshalling
of the debtor's assets to a quick liquidation with creditors; where there
are no assets, and it has been determined that the debtor has no
present ability to pay, to dismiss the proceedings. As was seen in
the previous sections, one of the causes for frequent continuances of
the proceedings, and the use of the capias as a collection club, is the
ability of the creditor's attorney to arrange with the debtor for a
basis of instalment payments outside court. It would seem desirable
that there should be compulsory and systematic hearings before the
Commissioner on every order for instalment payments with sufficient
flexibility provided for a settlement with the creditor on the basis
of a part payment and readjustments or a moratorium when needed.
But no penalty should be imposed for mere failure to pay in full or
in part by non-judgment debtors who have availed themselves of
the Commissioner's trusteeship. In order to facilitate the hearings
which, under the present judicial procedure, are time consuming for
creditor and debtor alike, the Clerk of the Poor Debtor Court should
be given power to pass on motions and petitions (as is done by the
Clerk of the Superior Equity Court). There should be reserved for
59. See Pound, The Administration of Justice in the Mfodcrn City (1912)
26 HARV. L. REv. 302, 318. For an incisive treatment of the administration of
justice for the poor litigant, see Maguire, op. cit. supra, note 25.
60. See note 9, supra.
61. Ibid.
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the Commissioner the conduct of the examination and the general debt
administration. To make for a more systematic procedure and to as-
sure a greater degree of certainty for the creditor than now exists, a
sliding-income scale (to take account of dependents, number of cred-
itors, and the size of the debt owed) should be adopted as the measure
of a debtor's ability to pay. Such a device would serve to inform the
creditor of the precise amount he might hope to collect from his
debtor by instalment payments; realizing in advance the exact possi-
bilities for receiving payments on a judgment, it would further tend
to clear a congested docket of those cases for which supplemqntary
proceedings should never have been brought by the creditor. More-
over, with fore-knowledge by the creditor of the exact possibilities of
collection, such a device might serve as a check on the present com-
petitive use of consumption credit by Boston merchants and loan com-
panies. Whether any of the foregoing procedural and administrative
suggestions for the re-organization of the Boston Poor Debtor Court
would be of avail to either creditor or debtor so long as there exists
in the background of the court a socially chaotic and planless flow of
consumption credit readily accessible to the consumer, is difficult to
determine. 2 But it is believed that in the light of the data and pro-
cedural experience of the Boston Poor Debtor Court which has been
presented, the reorganization of the court as a collection court along
the suggested lines may point a way to an administrative procedure
more consonant with vital creditor-d~btor problems in one metro-
politan city.
62. See Sturges and Cooper, loc. cit. supra note 9.
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